China’s Navy making waves in the Pacific

During naval maneuvers off the southwestern coast of Taiwan in late January, a Taiwan sub-hunting aircraft detected a suspicious seagoing object stalking the area. Naval commanders diverted the 168th fleet from maneuvers off Taiwan’s eastern coast to the area to assist in tracking the object. And as naval personnel scrambled to sift through technical readings and naval forces tracked the object, suspicion immediately pointed toward the presence of a mainland Chinese submarine.
Despite Beijing’s constant assurances of its peaceful intentions—delivered the world over at nearly every opportunity—mainland China is increasingly facing a credibility gap. On the one hand, the regime in Beijing is increasingly engaged in the existing international framework for both trade and security issues. It is an active participant in the World Trade Organization, where it spars peacefully with the U.S. and other nations over such things as trade barriers and tariffs.
In the security sphere, mainland China has gone from an active exporter of nuclear technology to a key member of nonproliferation efforts. And as the sole nation with any leverage over the leaders of North Korea, it has been the most vital member of efforts to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear activity. Indeed, in many respects Beijing’s security concerns increasingly align with the international community.
Yet on the other hand, mainland China is flexing its muscles diplomatically and, increasingly, militarily. For certain, the leadership in Beijing is feeling pretty full of itself. When the U.S. government recently released a human rights report criticizing mainland China’s record, Beijing shot back by blaming the U.S. for the recent financial crisis. After having weathered the global collapse and partly anchored the world economy through the storm, Beijing was in no mood for a lecture.
More troubling still is that Beijing’s leaders indicate that their capable financial stewardship is directly tied to their form of governance. A sure hand at the rudder steered mainland China through the storm. From Beijing’s point of view, the financial collapse indicated the weakness of Washington to direct national economic policy and to provide social stability. America was simply addicted to easy money and cheap consumer products, and the messiness of democratic governance had crippled Washington’s ability to ensure economic stability. After the crisis, Beijing for once decided to deliver the lectures and wag its finger.
Growing confidence in Beijing is also leading to a questioning of U.S. military dominance in the Pacific. During the past few decades, Beijing has been content to let the U.S. Navy act as a stabilizing force in the Pacific. The U.S. security umbrella has prevented Japan from returning to offensive capabilities and lulled other nations in East Asia a restrained defense posture—all while mainland China is building robust offensive capabilities, including a blue-water navy.
Beijing argues that the ability to project military force farther into the Pacific is required by its growing reliance on foreign oil and trade goods, which flow through sea lanes skirting Southeast Asia. How then does this explain a pattern of submarine excursions eastward into the Pacific?
In 2004, for example, a mainland Chinese nuclear-powered submarine set Japan on high alert when it plied through Japanese territorial waters. The sub then proceeded to Guam, a U.S. territory and the sight of an important Pacific naval base, where it circled the island before returning to the Chinese mainland.
In 2006, a mainland Chinese submarine surfaced within firing range of the USS Kitty Hawk, an aircraft carrier, and its battle group. Two years later it had a standoff with the same battle group after the Kitty Hawk sailed through the Taiwan Strait on its way to Japan. And in the summer of 2009, a mainland Chinese submarine collided with the sonar gear of the USS John S. McCain while tracking the U.S. warship near the Philippines.
Is it not surprising then that Taiwanese forces would suspect a mainland Chinese submarine when a suspicious craft was detected near its chief naval base at Kaohsiung? In fact, mainland Chinese spy ships have been detected repeatedly over the past decade poking around Taiwan territorial waters, most likely mapping the difficult undersea terrain of the Taiwan Strait for the navigation of its submarine fleet.
The object detected late January was never identified, but mainland China will surely continue to test the waters. Indeed, the mainland Chinese navy’s cat-and-mouse games with the U.S. Navy and its incursions into the territorial waters of other East Asian nations threaten a half-century of Pacific security arrangements.
No amount of reassurance from Beijing’s leaders will dispel the sense of unease that the mainland Chinese navy is spreading through its aggressive naval posture in the waters around East Asia. To be credible, the conciliatory words of Beijing’s leaders must be matched by the actions of mainland China’s navy. So long as the mainland Chinese navy continues its shadowboxing in the Pacific, democratic nations will remain skeptical of Beijing’s peaceful intentions and continue to prepare for the worst.

By Robert Green, a contributor to the Economist Intelligence Unit on Taiwan.